INTERNATIONAL FORUM: UKRAINE’S EURO-ATLANTIC FUTURE

(Brussels, Belgium – 30/31 March 2009)

Presentation by Ihor Kozak

Ladies and Gentlemen:

First of all, I would like to state that it is a great honour for me to partake in this Forum; thank you kindly for the invitation. Secondly, I would like to use this unique opportunity to briefly address the topic of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, as a Director (International Relations) of the League of Ukrainian Canadians and as a representative of the International Conference in Support of Ukraine, and in addition, on behalf of the broader Ukrainian Diaspora. 

In my presentation, I will be focusing on the following two aspects of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration:

1. Our assessment of the progress to date; and

2. Our recommendations on the way forward.

It is also my intent to address the above two points along the following two vectors:

1. Feedback/ suggestions for the state of Ukraine; and

2. Feedback/ suggestions for the West (NATO member sates).

I.          Efforts of the State of Ukraine 

Assessment

Our feedback to the State of Ukraine is two-fold:

1.         On the one hand, within a purely military dimension, Ukraine’s NATO membership related efforts and progress can be classified as concrete and sufficient; examples include, but are not limited to:

- Significant attempts to modernize the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF);

- Continuous transformation of the UAF for the purpose of reaching NATO standards;

- Ukraine’s active participation in a multitude of international military programs (e.g. Partnership for Peace, Arms Control Verification, Military Training and Assistance Program, etc.); having personally partaken in a myriad of NATO-Ukraine related undertakings, I can attest to the fact that the efforts and cooperation of the Ukrainian military officers and civilian personnel have been second to none.

- Ukraine’s military close and proactive co-operation with NATO-member armed forces on the international arena (e.g. former Yugoslavia); and

- The overall consensus between Brussels and Kyiv on the UAF's future military reforms and the approach in carrying them out.

2.         On a political front, on the other hand, Ukraine’s NATO membership related efforts are believed to be positive, but at the same time – inadequate. Event though, a great deal of progress has been achieved on the give front by the Ukrainian diplomats, there some serious shortfalls on the part of Ukrainian political leadership, the major three areas of concern being as follows: 

- Insufficient initiative, funding and control of the processes of building a pro-NATO support amongst citizens of Ukraine and consensus amongst country’s political forces. To date, the majority of Ukrainians still knows very little about NATO per se, basing their perceptions predominantly on, either old Soviet-era stereotypes or new Russia-generated propaganda. At the same time we notice a paradox: a large majority of those Ukrainians that do not support Ukraine’s NATO membership, are in favour of Ukraine’s EU aspirations. It is obvious from this example that the so-called anti-NATO flavour is based on biased and artificially generated grounds and thus can be (and must be) dissolved by the leadership of Ukraine as soon as possible.  It should also be mentioned here that, as of late, Ukrainian politicians and media have been often stating that, due to serious efforts by the Ukrainian Government in the Ukraine-NATO related information and education fields, some significant positive results have been achieved (more specifically, it is being stated that according to recent polls, now 30 per cent of Ukrainians stand for joining NATO, in comparison to less than 20 percent a year ago). While the above statistics and trends are very positive and encouraging, one has to question the root cause of the given polling results’ changes and how much of that positive data can be directly attributed to the efforts of the Ukrainian political leadership… no doubt, Russian military invasion of Georgia and the most recent natural gas sabotage of Ukraine also played a significant role here;

- Insufficient efforts by the Ukrainian leadership to reach consensus on Ukraine’s pro-NATO vector. Even though all three major Ukrainian leaders (Viktor Yuschenko, Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych) have been expressing their support for Ukraine’s NATO membership, their vision, as far as timeframes and approaches go, seem to differ and dynamically evolve over time. In the mean time, according to the US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, lack of Ukrainian leadership’s unified position is the major roadblock to the Ukraine-NATO dialogue on the  next level (20 February, Krakow); and

-  Insufficient efforts in building support with NATO member states; more specifically, in its efforts to convince the West to expedite Ukraine’s NATO integration the Ukrainian leadership is not maximizing on Ukraine’s unique strategic geopolitical positioning, the potential of its closest neighbours (the so-called New Europe) and the Ukrainian Diaspora.

In brief, as per historical realities and in light of both, the latest developments in the Caucasus region and the recent Russia’s natural gas sabotages, as well as Russia’s open threats towards Ukraine and the European Union over the recent Ukraine-EU agreement on upgrading Ukraine’s aging gas-pipeline network, it should be obvious to Ukraine’s leadership that to use the country’s ‘neutrality’ as a guarantee of its independence is, simply put, a nonsense; on a contrary, making NATO membership the top priority (not only de-jure, but by taking concrete, proactive and aggressive steps in this direction) is the only plausible solution to ensuring Ukraine’s long-term independence and prosperity.

 Recommendations 

We recommend to the state of Ukraine to:

- Conduct a chain of powerful pro-NATO information/ educational campaigns, aimed at exposing and dissolving both, the old Soviet myths and the current Russian propaganda, while showing the positive pragmatic benefits of the Alliance's membership; utilise all means at the Ukrainian state's disposal (media, state administration, public education system, etc.) to deliver the right message to the masses. A number of former USSR/ former Warsaw Pact countries successfully underwent that exact route, Poland being a prime example - learn from them;

- Develop one pan-Ukrainian leadership Ukraine-NATO position that could be maintained notwithstanding any internal political turmoil or government re-shuffles;

- Actively lobby Western Governments, especially Germany and France, by showing the pragmatic side (i.e. what’s in it for them in allowing Ukraine to join NATO);

- Begin relying, more heavily, on the support of the New Europe (recent NATO members); and

-  Maximize on the numerous opportunities stemming from the Ukrainian state’s co-operation with NATO-oriented NGOs and the Ukrainian Diaspora.

2.         Efforts of the Western (NATO Member) States.

Assessment

It depends on the country:

- US: Excellent to date and, hopefully, it remains this way.

The US Government has been most supportive of Ukraine's NATO aspirations, on every level. The most recent positive comments by the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who on the 5th of March in Brussels stated: " We should continue to open NATO's door to European countries such as Georgia and Ukraine and help them meet NATO standards",  as well as even more recent statement of President Barack Obama, who intends to “…  send a clear signal throughout Europe that we are going to abode by the central belief that countries who seek and aspire to join NATO are able to join NATO”, provide us with a strong hope that the new US administration will stay the course set by its predecessors.

At the same time, however, we have concerns. This apprehension of ours stems from the recent statements made by certain influential and credible forces within the United States of America (I am referring here to the so called Hart-Hagel Commission report).

We are in full agreement with the statements of the Hart-Hagel Commission report, which urge a focus on shared interests between United States and Russian Federation, including dealing with Iran's nuclear program, strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, stabilizing Afghanistan, and reducing strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. What we cannot agree with, however, is the notion that this enhanced US-Russia cooperation should take place at the expanse of the West’s relationship with Ukraine and Georgia, more specifically – these countries’ future NATO membership. In this regard, we feel that the current position of both President Obama and the Secretary of State Clinton is much more plausible (I am referring to their present vision that a much closer co-operation with Russia is possible without a need to abandon the ongoing process of Ukraine’s and Georgia’s NATO integration).

In this regard, we also share the opinion of the Russian political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky, who believes that U.S. expectations for greater cooperation with Russia will be a disappointment as "There is another serious factor: Russian domestic politics...[ ] considering there is a deep economic crisis and growing social tension, the Putin regime cannot allow itself the luxury of giving up such a remarkable enemy as the United States." (Senior U.S. Delegations Hope To 'Reset' U.S.-Russia Relations, March 20, 2009, published by RFE/RL). That is to say, Russia uses the United States and NATO as foreign scapegoats for the purpose of shifting blame for its domestic problems.

Finally, we believe that, over the past decade and a half, Ukraine has demonstrated, on numerous occasions, its pro-West, pro-NATO and pro-US stance; the following two examples speak volumes in this regard:

1) Ukraine’s decision to unilaterally abandon its (third largest in the world) nuclear weapons arsenal; and

2) Ukraine’s unconditional support of the US War on Terror (not in a pro forma manner, but actually sending troops to Iraq); Ukraine’s active participation in UN–led stabilization of former Yugoslavia;  and Ukraine’s ongoing support of NATO forces in Afghanistan with Strategic Airlift.

- Canada: Excellent to date and, hopefully, it remains this way

Canada's unconditional support for NATO's approval of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine has been most appreciated (especially, Prime Minister Stephen Harper's strong statements made during the NATO Summit in Bucharest, in April of 2008).  Canada's generous assistance, continuously provided to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the areas of military education and training, is also of significant value. Overall, Canada’s support of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations has been strong and steady throughout the entire duration of the process, which is in line with Canada-Ukraine long-standing exemplary relationship and Canada’s support of Ukraine from the very first steps of Ukraine’s independence, following the collapse of the USSR.

Canada's backing of Ukraine's NATO aspirations, however, could be more proactive in nature, especially in convincing other key NATO member states to withdraw their reservations and to provide Ukraine with the green light. For instance, Canada (upon Ukraine’s invitation) could start acting as a moderator in Ukraine’s talks with those NATO powers that currently block Ukraine’s NATO membership. Taking into consideration Canada’s geopolitical importance and most positive international reputation, its leadership role within the North-Atlantic Alliance, and its long-standing history of solid positive co-operation with Ukraine, Canada is well positioned to assume this role.     

- The "New Europe": Very Good, but could be more proactive. 

These Ukraine's neighbouring states' unconditional support for the approval of Ukraine's MAP and their active long-standing cooperation with the Ukrainian Government, on both military and political levels, has been most positive and beneficial. 

The New Europe's support for Ukraine's NATO aspirations, however, could also be more proactive in nature, especially in convincing other key NATO member states (the fellow European Union partners) to re-evaluate their position towards Ukraine and to embrace Ukraine as an integral part of the European geopolitical landscape. Having Ukraine onboard as a fellow NATO member would only strengthen these states’ own national security and result in significant political and economic benefits.  

- The "Old Europe": Positive, but could be better.

Notwithstanding active and generous support provided to the Ukrainian military in the areas of military education and training as well as strong constructive cooperation on a political level during numerous working meetings, Germany and France, de facto, block Ukraine's opportunity to join NATO in the nearest future. The reason is believed to be multi-faceted, and yet the single major factor is, no doubt, Old Europe's desire not to irritate Russia. 

In light of the latest developments in the Caucasus region and Russia’s most recent natural gas sabotage of the entire Europe, on the one hand, and Ukraine's strategic geopolitical positioning in the heart of Europe, on the other, it should become clear to Western Europe that the new-old Russian threat is out there and on the rise. Thus, it is in Germany's/ France's (and others') own best national interests (political and economic) to incorporate Ukraine into their Euro-Atlantic sphere as soon as possible, rather than ask later the familiar question “Who lost Ukraine?” 

As for the West’s relationship with Russia, we are most supportive of closer cooperation in this regard, but not at the expense of Ukraine and other European sovereign states that the Russian Federation is so keen on calling their “near abroad” or “sphere of influence”. Instead, we urge all concerned to heed the advice of Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser to the President of the United States Jimmy Carter, who stated the following: “The key point to bear in mind is that Russia cannot be in Europe without Ukraine also being in Europe, whereas Ukraine can be in Europe without Russia being in Europe. Assuming that Russia decides to cast its lot with Europe, it follows that ultimately it is in Russia's own interest that Ukraine be included in the expanding European structures. Indeed, Ukraine's relationship to Europe could be the turning point for Russia itself…[…] either to be a part of Europe as well or to become a Eurasian outcast, neither truly of Europe nor Asia and mired in its "near abroad" conflicts." (The Great Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (1997), p.122)

Very topical in this regard is the most recent position of the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who on the 23ed of March stated that the EU’s decision to assist Ukraine in modernizing its aging gas-pipeline network is "ill-considered and unprofessional" and that Moscow would have to review its relations with European partners should its interests be ignored. As they say, no further comments…

Recommendations 

Our recommendations to the Western democracies, NATO members, are as follows:

- Russia, most likely, will not support Ukraine's NATO bid any time soon and hence the West needs to realize that a certain degree of confrontation with Russia over Ukraine is unavoidable. As per current realities, Russia is a threat to the West's own safety and stability and hence the question at hand is what will the West choose - to absorb a small amount of confrontation now or to pay a full price in the future? To this end, the Western democracies (especially Germany and France) are being strongly encouraged to make the right decision of choosing Ukraine as their strategic partner and thus supporting Ukraine's NATO membership as soon as possible, notwithstanding Russia’s resistance. 

- The West can always find reasons to block Ukraine’s NATO membership, now or in the future, such as: ongoing political confrontation between various Ukrainian parties, country's serious economic crisis, low pro-NATO support amongst Ukraine's general population, etc., etc., etc. The facts are, however, that: many NATO member states have also been facing, for years (and some continue to face), high levels of political instability; the current economic crisis is global in nature; and there are recent examples of when some of the newest NATO members did not have a full national consensus on the NATO membership topic prior to joining (after all, a national referendum before obtaining NATO membership is not a prerequisite to joining the Alliance, neither is the Membership Action Plan). To this end, it is our position that, notwithstanding a number of real (or imaginary) obstacles on Ukraine's road to NATO membership, the West should take a much more proactive (as opposed to its current indecisive) approach and should welcome Ukraine as a new member as soon as possible - in a similar manner it had previously embraced such states as Poland or Romania and is presently welcoming Albania.

Finally, playing a role of devil’s advocate, one has to consider what alternatives would Ukraine have should it be continuously denied NATO membership? Considering the real Russian threat and the lack of other non-NATO plausible substitutes, Ukraine may end up in a situation, where it’s only option is to re-establish its nuclear status… It is important to fully appreciate, however, that we are not (and I repeat – we are not) encouraging Ukraine, at this point in time, to pursue this route, we are simply hypothesizing reasonable options, which are not many for Ukraine to follow.

At the end of the day, however, we are confident that common sense will prevail and that both Ukraine and the West will take the necessary steps to facilitate Ukraine’s seamless Euro-Atlantic integration as soon as possible, thus taking a quantum leap towards finally uniting and stabilizing the entire continent of Europe, once and for all.

Thank you.

Ihor Kozak, MBA

Director, International Relations 

League of Ukrainian Canadians